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The use of comprehensive, planned programs of activities for the 
control of occupational accidents has been a relatively recent develop­
ment in industry in the United States. Such industry previous to the 
nineteenth century was of the handicraft variety using simple hand tools 
and manual or animal-powered machinery with extremely limited speeds and 
capacities. Only a few of the simpler varieties of materials were used, 
and these in small quantities. Seldom did the number of workers exceed 
two or three in any one plant or work location. 
The early years of the nineteenth century marked the beginning of 
the use of mechanically-powered machinery with greatly-increased power and 
production capacity. This in turn, involved larger quantities of materials 
and greater numbers of employees in the plant. The occupational hazards of 
the handicraft era became more severe and were supplemented with additional 
types of hazards inherent in the beginnings of the "machine age." 
The absence of reliable occupational-accident records for the early 
years of American industry makes it impossible to document (but it is gen­
erally accepted by students of industrial safety) that occupational acci­
dents did occure in considerable numbers and that these numbers increased 
increased significantly during the eras mentioned above. Employers and the 
public persisted in the attitude that accidents to employees were inevitable 
by-products of production and that the employee accepted certain risks of 
accidents inherent in the job when he accepted employment. Even where 
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employees regarded these concepts as unjust, they seldom could recover any 
losses resulting from occupational accidents because of the need for es­
tablishing negligence on the part of the employer, and the availability to 
the employer of certain common-law defenses. 
Later in the nineteenth century, public reaction to the growing ac­
cident toll and the economic plight of the injured worker and his family, 
developed to the extent that widespread demands were made for corrective 
legislation. Some examples of the state sponsored legislation directed 
toward the safety problem during this early period were given by Heinrich 
(1). 
Massachusetts 
1867- Instituted factory inspection 
1869- Established first state bureau of labor statistics 
1877- Compelled guarding of dangerous moving machinery 
1887- Passed an employer's liability law 
Alabama 
1885- Passed an employer's liability law 
New Jersey 
1911- Passed first state workmen's compensation law 
The legislation sought to reduce hazards to factory workers by pro­
viding for safety inspections by State inspectors based on crude safety 
standards largely directed toward safeguarding moving machinery elements. 
Other laws attempted to provide partial relief to the injured employee for 
losses including medical treatment expenses and loss of income. The "em­
ployer liability" type of law proved ineffectual because of the legal dif­
ficulty of establishing employer negligence and because of the economic 
difficulty due to the expense and delay elements of a common-law legal ac­
tion. The subsequent Workmen's Compensation Acts overcame these difficul­
ties by eliminating questions of negligence and providing routine procedures 
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for disposing of occupational injury claims promptly and usually without 
expense to the injured employee. Workmen's Compensation Acts were declared 
unconstitutional by the courts in several instances as they were held to 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment by "taking of a person's property without 
due process of law." However, in 1917, the Supreme Court of the United 
States declared that a State could enforce such laws under its power to 
protect the public health, safety, and welfare. 
Industrial employers were gradually accepting more responsibility for 
the provision of safe working conditions and work methods beyond that com­
pelled by law. Some were impressed by the temporary or permanent disability 
of needed skilled workers or the costly damage to machinery and tools, while 
others were motivated by humane reasons but in either case, the legal as­
signment of the responsibility and attendant costs of industrial accidents 
to the employer gave added impetus to accident-control measures by the em­
ployers . 
Early accident-control efforts concentrated on the guarding of ma­
chinery particularly of the more massive, faster types. The size and speed 
of such machinery suggested a high degree of hazard with possibilities of ser­
ious or even fatal injuries. The accident records s after extensive machinery 
safeguarding, clearly demonstrated that machinery hazards and their control 
constituted only a segment of the industrial accident problem and that the 
scope of the control program needed to be expanded to include safe walkways s 
safe material storage and handlings, proper tools, etc. Furthermore, the 
approach to the control of hazards had to be enlarged from that of exclu­
sively engineering of machinery and machine accessories to encompass super­
visory control of work practices and improved training of employees. The 
prevailing attitude of management toward safety measures during these early 
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years regarded them as welfare activities and not as a means of attaining 
increased profit through accident reduction. In 1928, the Committee on 
Safety and Production of the American Engineering Council dispelled this 
opinion by stating "that there is a positive correlation between safety 
and efficiency of production and, in general, the safe factory is the ef­
ficient factory"(2). The integration of safety into the normal production 
and maintenance operations is now widely accepted and gains in production 
are being realized concurrently with gains in safety. Safety in the indus­
trial operations does not hinder production but aids the worker in oper­
ating with improved efficiency. This increase in worker-effectiveness has 
prompted management to place more emphasis on the safety program and to 
encourage compliance with safe practices in industrial operations. 
The control of a hazard requires at the outset an accurate identifi­
cation or definition of the hazard to be controlled. This is not only a 
matter of definition of the problem to be solved, but permits some evalua­
tion of the various hazards which seem to merit prompt attention and the 
development of the priorities as to which of the hazards shall receive 
earliest attention. The National Safety Council, American Standards Asso­
ciation, American Society of Safety Engineers, and others have published 
materials suggesting the hazards which could be expected in various indus­
trial operations or situations as well as appropriate corrective measures. 
However, such listings merely provide clues to the detailed identification 
of the hazards and rarely will suffice in the complete hazard identifica­
tion and the priorities involved. Some of the more serious hazards have 
been the subject of State and Federal legislation including mandatory com­
pliance provisibns. 
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The detailed identification of the hazards in the more complex in­
dustrial operations has been attempted in many different ways. The ap­
proach most widely used relies on frequency and severity rates based on 
the number of accidents, number of lost days, and the manhours of expo­
sure in accordance with American Standards Association, Z16.1, American 
Standard Method of Recording and Measuring Work Injury Experience (3). 
Disabling Injury Frequency Rate = 
Number of Disabling Injuries x 1,000,000 
Employee-hours of Exposure 
Disabling Injury Severity Rate = 
Total Days Charged x 1,000,000 
Employee-hours of Exposure 
These measures have been primarily used as "after the fact" evalua­
tions of performance and appraisals of safety effectiveness. The indus­
tries, companies, plants, etc. with the highest rates are considered the 
most hazardous and assumed to have prime importance in any safety effort. 
The utilization of this method, in any specific industrial operation, is 
likely to be difficult because of the sizeable manhour exposure require­
ment for adequate statistical reliability. The number of accidents as 
well as the manhours1 exposure is often relatively small for any reason­
able time period and the results of these rates would tend to be unreli­
able. If the time period is lengthened to provide for a larger sample 
size, the validity of the measure is affected by time variations in pro­
duction methods, physical facilities, labor force and even in the safety 
activities. 
C. V. Culbertson (4) discussed a method of analyzing the frequency 
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and severity rates in certain industrial operations. This study examined 
those portions of the operations of an industrial organization which con­
tributed most to the over-all accident rates. It was determined that im­
provement in the most hazardous operations would contribute the greatest, 
rate improvements to the organization. As with conventional methods, 
this procedure required the use of previous accident records for the spe­
cific operation with the accompanying problems of statistical reliability. 
A point, which was not considered, involved the evaluation of existing 
hazards in an operation which, as yet, had not caused an accident, yet 
appeared to possess appreciable hazard potential. 
A different method of safety analysis of industrial operations was 
suggested by J. V. Grimaldi (5). Attempts were made to correlate various 
production cost data, such as salvage costs, material costs, labor costs, 
etc., with the safety experience of the organization. There was a slight 
indication that the salvage cost of an organization was negatively corre­
lated with the accident experience but no further conclusions were drawn. 
The identification of a safety hazard will not 5 in itself, elimi­
nate the accidents due to that hazard in the industrial operation. An 
effective means must be developed to control the hazards present in any 
operation and to determine on which hazard to place the most emphasis. 
The objective of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that an in­
dex can be developed to evaluate the extent of over-all hazard and the 
characteristics of that hazard in certain occupational activities. This 
index will provide a means of predicting future accident performance, 
under existing conditions and a measure of the benefits to be expected 
from changed conditions which reduce the. hazard. The hypothesis will be. 
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tested by correlation of the index to sets of historical data. The corre­
lation thus developed with actual performance reflected in historical 
data, will then be studied to determine the validity of the model. The 
number of accidents occurring and the number of mandays lost due to acci­
dents in the operation, will be used to measure the degree of hazard as­
sociated with the operation. 
CHAPTER IT. 
A SAFETY INDEX FOR EVALUATION OF HAZARD 
Accident-control activities, of many varied types, have been in­
creasingly used by almost every major segment of American industry down 
through the years. Even in the early era when motivation for such meas­
ures was largely based on a welfare attitude by management, and in­
creasingly with wider recognition of the impact of accidents on produc­
tion efficiency and the appearance of pertinent laws and regulations3 
the use of safety measures has steadily expanded. 
The utilization of the frequency and severity rates was one of 
the typical control methods used during this period. Management tended 
to concentrate their safety efforts upon the operations with the highest 
rates in an attempt to improve the over-a.1.1 accident experience. Numer­
ous modifications of this rate computation were introduced in an effort 
to arrive at a more effective measure of safety performance, but: these 
modified rates in large measure retained the limiting characteristics 
previously attributed to the ASA frequency and severity rates. 
The identification of the "accident-prone" individual and his dis 
missal or transfer to alleviate, relatively poor individual accident re­
cords was another method used to decrease the accident experience in an 
organization. Many companies, in the early 1950's, considered any perso 
with more than one accident to be accident-prone. It was assumed that 
this factor, inherent in the individual, could not be corrected. Studie 
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of the accident experience of the workers in an industrial organization 
indicated that the number of accidents per worker approached an "L-
shaped" distribution with a few workers incurring a majority of the in­
dustrial accidents (6). The description of the accident-prone indivi­
dual gradually gave way to the identification of "accident-repeaters." 
The identification of these workers was established on the basis of the 
number of accidents incurred in a specific operation and it was not as­
sumed that this trait would be present in the same worker in another op­
eration. As the identification of hazards in industry became more re­
fined, the number of workers placed in the "accident-repeater" category 
diminished. W. B. Kerr (7) indicated that the accident-prone person 
did not incur a majority of the accidents but only one to fifteen per­
cent of the occurrences. Thus this approach did not afford promise of 
any sizeable reduction in the over-all accident record. 
Another control procedure for determining the distribution of in­
juries in an industrial operation was introduced by H. Gene Miller (8). 
This procedure evaluated the number of accidents per worker in an or­
ganization by use of a logarithmic scale. An example of this method in­
volved an operation with 1000 employees and an average of 1.5 injuries 
per worker. It was shown that, in the entire organization, one worker 
could incur seven injuries and still be considered in the normal dis­
tribution. This observation supports the contention that persons who in­
cur more accidents than their contemporaries may not necessarily be acci­
dent-prone. 
The industrial accident statistics for the period 1926 to 1940 
showed a reduction in the frequency rate from 33 to 13 for the industry 
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as a whole (9). This reduction cannot be attributed to the specific con­
trol measures attempted since the hazards obvious to industrial personnel, 
were attacked and any measure could have operated effectively. The sta­
tistics for the years following 1940 have indicated a "leveling off" of 
the reduction in accident experience as indicated by a frequency of 14 
in 1942, 13 in 1946, and 10 in 1951. This fact would suggest serious 
doubts as to whether the somewhat limited control measures of the im­
mediate past years provide a sound basis for effective improvements in 
accident experience in future years. 
There is always the risk of accidental injury in any activity in 
which humans are involved. This risk varies from one of minor injury to 
one of accidental death of the employee and from very frequent to infre­
quent occurrences. The most effective industrial safety program is con­
cerned not with the question of eliminating all risks or hazards in an 
operation but of directing the efforts toward those hazards of greater 
accident potential and those in which a favorable economic balance is 
obtained between the cost of hazard control and the reduction in acci­
dent cost. Direction of the safety efforts to these areas will provide 
the most effective accident reduction procedure for any industrial opera­
tion. The problem in the most effective utilization of effort is one of 
identifying the most significant hazards in the operation. Heretofore^ 
analysis of the industrial hazards has been on a basis of frequency and 
severity rates which were of questionable reliability. An industrial op­
eration might not incur a disabling injury for an extended period while 
a comparable operation in another location might incur many injuries in 
a short period. The comparison of frequency and severity rates will show 
a great difference with as little as one accident in organizations of 
small numbers of manhours of exposure. 
Identification of industrial hazards was often performed on a 
purely subjective basis. The combination of events leading up to the id 
entification of the most hazardous operations has introduced a lack of 
definity and often an unacceptable degree of error in the hazard evalua­
tion. 
Efforts have been made to determine segments of the organization 
in which the best improvement could be made. Units such as plants, de­
partments, and even individual persons have been identified as high-
hazard units. Efforts have been made to decrease the hazards in these 
units of the organization with no basis other than the subjective deci­
sion of the safety specialist and management. The decision mechanisms, 
utilizing frequency and severity rates, in many cases proved inadequate 
for establishing the areas for greatest concentration of the safety ef­
fort due to the question of reliability of the measures and the inabilit 
to adequately estimate the amount of improvement to be expected. Little, 
information is available on the correlation of a specific amount of safe 
ty effort to an associated improvement in accident potential. 
To adequately combat any industrial accident problem, the causes 
of accidents must be investigated. This investigation should lead to 
an estimate of the accident potential of the industry and indications as 
to where effort should best be placed for the effective reduction of 
this accident potential. The procedure for evaluating the degree of haz 
ard associated with a particular operation, to be developed in this the­
sis, will provide a more effective procedure for use in determining alio 
cation of safety resources. Examination of the past data in a 
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determination of the degree and nature of the hazard should provide a more 
reliable tool since accident experience, or lack of accidents, will not 
affect the results. Decisions, as to the degree of hazard, will be based 
on conditions existing in the operation at the time of the investigation 
and the data for the industry as a whole. The data pertaining to the en­
tire industry will be assumed to be more reliable than that of the spe­
cific operation since the industry has a larger number of accidents and 
larger exposure. It is assumed that, over a sufficiently long period of 
time, the distribution of accidents in the specific operation will ap­
proach that of that operation throughout the industry. It is further as­
sumed that the severity of accidents, due to a particular cause, in the 
specific operation will approach the severity of an accident, due to the 
same cause, in the industry. These assumptions appear to be logical since 
the industry, by definition, is composed of numerous similar organizations. 
The characteristic hazards involved in any industrial operation 
can be most easily identified by examination of the causal factors of 
accidents in the industry. Causes of accidents may include unsafe acts 
on the part of employees unsafe mechanical or physical conditions, pre­
existing physical limitations of employees, as well as other factors. 
The discussions in this thesis will be based upon the causal factors in 
the categories of "Unsafe Acts" and "Unsafe Conditions" since the main 
objective is to develop a method for identifying the degree of hazard 
involved in the operation and not with the condition of the operator. 
All accidents occurring in the industry are considered to be caused by 
some unsafe act or unsafe condition or a combination of these two. To 
effectively determine the causal factors in any operation, all the causal 
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factors of accidents in the industry must be itemized. This will pro­
vide an insight into the major hazards of the particular industry. Once 
the causal factors of accidents are discovered, the statistics of the in­
dustry will be examined to determine what percentage of the accidents 
were caused by each factor. This percentage should provide a basis for 
estimating which causal factor is most likely to be present in an acci­
dent occurring in the specific operation. The severity of the accidents 
in each causal category will then be determined by calculating the aver­
age number of mandays lost per accident, in each causal category. The 
product of the severity and the percentage of accidents occurring in each 
category will be defined as the "hazard index" of that category. The 
hazard index should provide an estimate of the effect each specific cau­
sal category has on the average severity of an accident in the industry. 
This will be considered the degree of hazard associated with each causal 
category. 
Mandays lost due to Accidents 
Hazard Index = - X 
No. Accidents in Category 
No. Accidents in Category 
Total Accidents in Industry 
On the basis of the assumptions concerning the relation of the 
distribution and the severity of accidents in the specific operation 
with that of industry., it follows that; if the operation had the same 
hazards associated with a particular causal factor, that were existing 
in the average industrial operation, the degree of hazard associated xvith 
that hazard in the operation would be the same sis the degree of hazard 
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associated with that causal factor in the average industrial operation. 
Common sense would indicate that all operations in an industrial field 
are not identical with respect to existing hazards. A rating must be de­
veloped to account for the differences between the specific operation and 
the average industrial operation. A rating system will be utilized to 
modify the hazard indices of the industry to provide an effective means 
of identifying the degree of hazard associated with the specific opera­
tion. The safety specialist will inspect the specific operation in ques­
tion with respect to the causal factors developed from the industrial 
data. Each factor will be evaluated and assigned a rating to indicate 
the degree to which it is present in the specific operations as com­
pared to the average industrial operation. A rating of 1.0 will be 
assigned when the degree of hazard is the same as that in the average 
operation and a rating of 0.0 will be assigned when the causal factor is 
not present in the specific operation. Ratings, varying from 1.0, will 
be used to.indicate to what degree each causal factor exists in the opera­
tion. 
The degree of hazard associated with each specific causal factor 
for the operation being considered will be the product of the hazard in­
dex and the rating of that causal factor in the specific operation. 
This will be defined as the "specific hazard index" and indicate the de­
gree of hazard associated with each causal factor in the Operation. This 
index will also indicate the amount each factor contributes toward the 
over-all accident potential of the operation and yield an estimate of the 
severity which might be expected, should an accident occur. 
The evaluation of the operation will continue until all causal 
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factors are considered. The specific hazard indices will then be added 
and the result will be defined as the "safety index" of the operation. 
The safety index will indicate the degree of hazard associated with the 
specific operation with respect to the average industrial operation. 
The highest specific hazard index will indicate the causal factor which 
contributes the greatest to the over-all index and the area which is like­
ly to provide the most economical investment of safety resources. The, 
operation with the highest safety index will also be considered the most 
hazardous and indicate the area of needed safety emphasis. 
The following chapters will examine a sample industry and estab­
lish a safety index for specific operations within that industry. The 
safety index will then be compared with the, past accident data for the. 
operations to determine its effectiveness as a measurement of hazard. 
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CHAPTER III 
APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED SAFETY INDEX 
The establishment of the safety index for a specific industrial 
operation requires an evaluation of the industry-wide accident experi­
ence. The industry to be considered;, can be a company, division., manu­
facturing complex or other geographic or political division which en­
compasses similar operations. The, size of the industry examined will de­
termine the degree to which the operational hazards can be defined. An 
individual plant can be defined as the industry under observation;, pro­
vided the number of accidents is sufficient to establish a valid distri­
bution. The number of accidents required for a valid measure will de­
pend upon the variability of the causes and other characteristics of the 
occurrences. 
The type of industry being considered will determine the various 
causal factors present in the specific operation. These causal factors 
can be delineated by analysis of the accident data. The causes of acci­
dents will vary somewhat with the specific industry. An over-all view 
of the various hazards present in an industry as well as the prevailing 
trends in accident control can be obtained from a listing of the speci­
fic causal factors. 
The data on industrial accidents will then be examined to deter­
mine the severity of accidents to be expected for each causal factor,, 
This severity will be based upon the average number of mandays lost due. 
to accidental injury to the worker. The severity of accidents vary with 
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the particular operation and cause of accident. It it assumed that all 
accidents occurring, due to each causal factor, will have an average se­
verity which can be estimated and used in forecasting the expected sever­
ity of a future occurrence due to the same causal factor. 
The industrial accident data will be further examined to determine 
what percentage of the accidents is attributable to each causal factor. 
This percentage will be based on the number of accidents occurring due to 
a specific cause, and the total number of accidents occurring in the in­
dustrial fceld for that causal category (unsafe act, unsafe condition, 
etc.). 
The severity and percentage of accidents occurring for each caus­
al factor will then be combined and the product will be defined as the 
hazard index for the cause. This hazard index will be used in determin­
ing the specific hazard indices and safety index of the operation. 
The major industrial field evaluated in this study was the Air 
Force Logistics Command of the United States Air Force. This organiza­
tion performs typical industrial operations such as, production, main­
tenance, and supply activities and accordingly provides a suitable appli­
cation of the hazard index model. The Air Force accident reporting pro­
cedures vary slightly from normal civilian industrial procedures. In­
juries which do not involve lost time to Air Force Personnel are not 
reported, while civilian accident statistics include the computation 
of the "medical cases," where the worker returned to the operation af­
ter treatment by some outside medical source. Civilian accident sta­
tistics include the actual cost of the medical treatment and disability 
payments under Workmen's Compensation Acts in the accident costs while 
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Air Force records are based on a standard cost figure of thirty dollars 
for military and fourteen dollars for civilian personnel for each day lost; 
due to accidental injury. The differences in the costing method between 
the civilian operations and the military operations will not affect the 
results of this thesis since the severity will be based on the days lost 
to each operator due to injury rather than accident costs. 
The data received from the United States Air Force for use in 
computing the safety index are categorized by activity of the person in­
volved in the accident. Only those activities relating to the specific 
industrial-type operations will be considered in the determination of the 
degree of hazard involved in that operation. The activities considered 
will be: USAF aircraft-maintenance, repair, towing, including related 
activities; USAF supply including related activities; and USAF Air In­
stallations (normal Air Base maintenance and construction). The other 
categories tabulated pertained to off-the-job activities such as; use of 
private motor vehicles, altercations and horseplay, sports activities, 
etc. 
The causal factors, involved in the categories listed, were ana­
lyzed and separated into two major causal categories; unsafe acts and 
unsafe conditions. A code number was assigned for each causal factor 
(Tables 1 and 3) in accordance with the established procedure of the 
Air Force accident classification. 
The data on the accidents in the Air Force Logistics Command we r e ­
evaluated to determine the severity and percentage of accidents pertain­
ing to each causal factor. The hazard indices were developed by the 
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field (Tables 2 and 4 ) . The hazard index., thus developed,, provided the 
basis for examination of the specific operation to determine the asso­
ciated degree of hazard. These hazard indices also provided an estimate 
of the most hazardous operations in the Command and an estimate of the 
amount an accident in the specific causal factor affects the average 
severity of an accident in the field. 
The application of the hazard indices to a specific operations 
will be described in the following chapter. These indices, along with 
the rating of the specific cause 2 should provide an accurate estimate 
of the degree of hazard and the characteristics of that hazard, asso­
ciated with the specific industrial operation. 
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Table 1 
Coding for Specific Causal Factors of Unsafe Conditions 
Code Unsafe Mechanical or Physical Condition 
01 Defective aircraft 
02 Defective motor vehicle, brakes 
10 Defective motor vehicle, motor,, clutch, transmission 
19 Defective motor vehicle, other 
20 Defective special purpose vehicle 
22 Extreme weather conditions (tornado, hurricane, windstorm, 
extreme heat, extreme cold, etc.) 
23 Glare from sun, other intense light sources 
25 Slippery surface from spillage or leakage 
26 Slippery surface due to ice, snow, sleet, rain, etc. 
27 Rough, defective, hazardous surface 
28 Smooth, highly polished surface 
29 Hazardous arrangement or procedure (unsafely stored or 
piled tools, materials, etc.; congestion of working 
spaces; inadequate aisle space, exits, etc.; unsafe 
planning and/or layout of traffic or process operations) 
30 Hazardous location (unprotected, unmarked floor openings., 
street intersections., excavations, etc.) 
31 Hazardous dress or apparel (does not pertain to personal 
protective equipment) 
32 Limited visibility due to fog, rain, snow, sleet, dust 
storm, etc. 
33 Improper or inadequate illumination 
34 Improperly designed machinery equipment, etc. 
35 Improperly guarded, unguarded machinery equipment, etc. 
36 Inadequate ventilation 
37 Mechanical failure of machinery, equipment, etc. 
38 Personal protective equipment not available 
39 Personal protective equipment defective or sub-standard 
40 Unvented vessels, containers, tanks, etc. 
41 Work space limitation, small, cramped due to nature of work 
42 Excessive noise due to aircraft run-up, aircraft take-off 
machine operation, vehicle operation., etc. 
55 Lack of, or unavailability of, prescribed or specially 
designed machinery, equipment, etc. 
97 Defective machinery, equipment, other. 
98 Unsafe mechanical or physical condition^ other 
99 No unsafe mechanical or physical condition 
Table 2 
Unsafe Conditions with Relation to Severity, 































































Coding for Specific Causal Factors of Unsafe Acts 
Unsafe Act of Person Reported 
Disregard of traffic controls 
Driving on the wrong side of the road 
Allowing personnel to ride on vehicle 
Backing vehicle without checking clearance or traffic 
Driving vehicle forward without checking clearance or 
traffic 
Excessive speed for conditions 
Failure to note, correct or report obvious defect of 
vehicle 
Failure to properly secure or check hitches of trailers, 
towbars, etc. 
Failure to secure load, seat personnel, close doors s or 
secure tail gate of special purpose vehicle 
Misues or improper use of vehicle 
Overloading 9 overs tress of vehicle 
Unsafe act, special purpose vehicle, etc. 
Extending body or part of body into hazardous location 
Getting on or off moving equipment or vehicles 
Jumping rather than ascending 3 dece.nding, crossing by 
other means 
Lifting j, moving j carrying while in improper position 
Riding in unsafe position 
Runnings walking too fast' for conditions 
Sitting j, standing or moving in awkward or hazardous manner 
Standing too close, to equipment, machine, or vehicle in 
operation 
Utilizing make, shifts instead of proper supports 
Arranging or placing objects or materials unsafely 
Holding or gripping objects or materials in securely or 
improperly 
Inadequate or no help in lifting, moving carrying objects 
or materials 
Introducing flame s heat 9,or other spark producing tools or 
equipment into hazardous area 
Lifting^ moving, carrying by hand,, when use of mechanical 
device is standard operating procedure and available 
Stacking material too high or improperly 
Improper adjustment of tool or equipment 
Improper use of tool or equipment (using heavy file as 
hammer) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Coding for Specific Causal Factors of Unsafe Acts 
Code Unsafe Act of Person Reported 
58 Unsafe use of tools or equipment, or otherwise using tools 
or equipment unsafely 
60 Use of defective tools, equipment or material 
61 Use of hands instead of proper tools or equipment 
63 Inadvertent or incorrect utilization of control or oper­
ating mechanism or device 
66 Cleaning, oiling, adjusting, repairing machines or equip­
ment while in operation 
67 Feeding or supplying too rapidly 
70 Failure to wear proper attire 
71 Failure to wear safety spectacles, goggles, gloves, masks, 
aprons, shoes, leggings, sports protective equipment, etc 
72 Wearing finger ring 
73 Wearing improper or defective footwear 
74 Wearing jewelry, chains, etc. 
79 Extended horseplay, practical joking 
83 Failure to (or adequately) block, shore or use cribbing 
84 Failure to check, inspect, signal or warn 
85 Failure to comply with tech orders, regulations, safety 
rules, etc. 
87 Failure to lock or secure vehicle, equipment, or machinery 
88 Failure to notice obvious hazard 
90 Failure to recognize or compensate for own physical limita­
tion or lack of ability 
91 Failure to remove or correct obvious hazard 
93 Failure to properly execute a sports action or maneuver 
94 Failure to use available safety device 
98 Miscellaneous unsafe act 
99 No unsafe act of person reported 
Table 4 
Unsafe Acts with Relation to Severity, 
Percentage of Occurrence, and Hazard Index 
Cause 
Code Severity _A Hazard Inc 
02 1.00 .001 .0010 
04 5.00 .001 .0050 
20 3.50 .002 .0070 
21 _ _ _ _ .022 _ _ _ _ _ 
22 3.21 .047 .1509 
23 .33 .015 .0050 
24 6.07 .013 .0789 
25 .005 
26 _ . .008 
27 1.40 .008 .0112 
29 2.18 .041 .0894 
31 13.99 .062 .8674 
32 5.00 .001 .0050 
33 4.20 .013 .0546 
34 6.15 .044 .2706 
36 45.00 .003 .1350 
37 14.64 .018 .2635 
38 8.13 . 100 .8130 
39 11.17 .005 .0559 
42 19.92 .011 .2191 
47 6.05 .016 .0968 
49 7.22 .041 .2960 
51 9.50 .002 .0190 
52 10.73 .009 .0966 
53 3.00 .001 .0030 
56 6.00 .006 .0360 
57 14.71 .018 .2648 
58 15.07 .012 .1808 
60 8.00 .008 .0640 
61 5.29 .006 .0317 
63 3.06 .015 .0459 
66 7.92 .011 .0871 
67 90.00 .001 .0900 
70 6.75 .003 .0203 
71 7.17 .025 .1793 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Unsafe Acts with Relation to Severity, 
Percentage of Occurrence, and Hazard Index 
Cause 
Code Severity %A Hazard Index 
72 14.21 .012 .1705 
73 3.50 .007 .0245 
74 16.00 .001 .0160 
79 7.00 .001 .0070 
83 .001 
84 7.14 .023 .1642 
85 11.29 .074 .8355 
87 4.93 .024 .1183 
88 10.20 .114 1.1628 
90 4.67 .008 .0374 
91 17.50 .028 .4900 
93 4.00 .001 .0040 
94 18.08 .010 .1808 
98 3.50 .002 .0070 
99 5.64 .112 .6317 
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CHAPTER IV 
TESTING OF PROPOSED SAFETY INDEX IN SPECIFIC 
INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 
The estimation of the degree of hazard associated with specific 
industrial operations utilizes the hazard indices developed for industry­
wide data and an examination of the specific operations. The specific 
industrial operation may be of any size or involve any production, main­
tenance, or supply facilities. The safety specialist investigates the 
operation and rates the degree of hazard in each causal category. This 
rating is then applied to the hazard indices of the industrial field to 
determine the specific hazard index for each causal factor. The spe­
cific hazard index will indicate the degree of hazard associated with 
the specific cause and estimate the effect that the cause has on the 
over-all accident experience of the operation. The summation of the 
specific hazard indices in an individual operation will yield the safety 
index of that operation. This safety index will be compared with the 
index developed for other operations to identify the more hazardous 
activities. The area with the highest safety index will be the most 
hazardous and the area with the lowest index will be the least hazzrd-
ous. Figure 1 indicates the development of the safety index from the 
causal factors of accidents in the industrial field. 
Industrial Accident Causal Factors 
Mandays Lost per 
Accident 
Percent of Total 






Specific Hazard Index 
All Other Specific 
Hazard Indices 
S A F E T Y I N D E X 
Figure 1 
Development of the Safety Index 
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The specific operations considered in this thesis were examined at 
Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. This division of the Air Force Logistics 
Command was chosen because it was immediately available and the accident 
statistics required were present in the Safety Office. The operations, 
which were to be rated, were selected from among four different areas 
of operation in an attempt to obtain an estimate of the applicability of 
the index to diversified operations. 
The first operation studied was the Air Terminal Division. This 
operation is similar to that of a material-handling section of a manu­
facturing plant or freight terminal. The major responsibility of this 
operation is the processing for shipment and receipt of all air trans­
ported shipments. This operation has an all weather, twenty-four hour, 
handling responsibility. 
The Sheet Metal Shop of the Maintenance and Repair Branch was the 
next operation studied. This operation rebuilds and repairs aircraft 
control surfaces and external coverings. The operations include power 
presses, brakes, and similar metal working machines. The portion of the 
operation evaluated was the control surface build-up and the pre-
assembly operations on raw materials. 
The Hydraulics Shop was the third operation studied. This 
activity involves the reworking and testing of all hydraulic components" 
of the aircraft system. Individual work stations are set up for the re­
working operation and a testing laboratory evaluates the finished prod­
uct. The hazard of high pressure., air and hydraulic, appeared to 
present significant accident causal factor to the operation. The re­
working section involves the normal production line hazards with small 
hand tools and manual assembly. 
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The Assembly and Blade Repair section of the Propeller Shop was 
the final operation considered. This section performs the rebuilding of 
propeller blades and associated control mechanisms. Radiation, use of 
small hand tools, and toxic chemicals were a few of the hazards asso­
ciated with this operation. 
Examination of these four areas was made s by the author, on a 
personal visit to Robins Air Force Base. The individual causal factors 
in each operation were rated and evaluated by the procedure established 
in this thesis. The safety index for each operation was developed to 
denote the associated degree of hazard. The establishment of this 
index was accomplished by the summation of the specific hazard indices 
for each operation. 
Past accident data for the four operations was then studied. 
This data included the accident records for 1959, 1960 3 and 1961 cal­
endar years. It was assumed that the data for this period would provide 
an adequate measure of the effectiveness of the safety index. Data for 
earlier periods was not regarded as accurate. The total number of 
accidents for the three year period in each operation were tabulated 
and listed with the number of mandays lost and the number of personnel 
involved in the operation (see Table 5 ) . 
The safety index, for each operation s was then tested by correla­
tion with the past data of the operations in question. Due to the small 
number of operations studied 9 a linear correlation was assumed 9 if one 
existed. The following formula was used to compute the coefficient of 
correlation between the safety index and the number of accidents per 
operation. 
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Where: x^ = safety index of the operation for 
i = 1 to n. 
y^ = number of accidents for the operation 
for i = 1 to n. 
The coefficient of correlation between the safety index and the 
number of accidents per operation was .908. This would indicate that 
the number of accidents per operation was positively correlated with the 
safety index of the operation. The safety index, however, is not de­
pendent upon the size of the operation but the number of accidents will 
depend upon the exposure of the employees. The coefficient of correla­
tion was then calculated between the safety index and the number of 
accidents per 100 employees in the operation. It was assumed that the 
number of accidents per 100 employees would not be dependent upon the 
size of the operation. The coefficient of correlation between the 
safety index and the number of accidents per 100 employees was .86. 
This figure was tested for significance and it was determined that the 
coefficient of correlation was significantly different from zero at the 
85 per cent level of significance. 
The analysis of the testing procedure indicated that the safety 
index was positively correlated with the number of accidents per 100 em­
ployees and the data concerning the severity of the accidents in each 
operation did not appear to be correlated for the number of operations 
studied. 
Table 5 
Comparison of Safety Index and 
Past Performance 
Past Performance 
Operation Employees No. of A c e Severity 
Air Term. 91 0 0 
Hydraulics 183 1 10 
Sheet Mtl. 237 3 30 









The objective of this thesis was to test the hypothesis that an 
index could be developed to evaluate the extent of over-all hazard and 
the characteristics of the hazard in certain occupational activities. 
It was assumed that this index would indicate the degree of hazard in 
an operation as characterized by the number and severity of accidents 
occurring in the operation. 
The causal factors of accidents in the Air Force Logistics Com­
mand of the United States Air Force were studied and a hazard index 
was developed which would indicate the degree of hazard associated with 
each cause. Four specific operations were examined at Robins Air Force 
Base, Georgia and a safety index was computed by combining the hazard 
indices and rating for each causal factor present in the operation. 
The results of this investigation were then tested by linear correlation 
with past accident data for the operations. It was shown that the 
safety index was slightly correlated with the number of accidents per 
100 employees per operation at the 85 per cent level of significance. 
No correlations were obtained between the safety index and the degree 
of hazard as indicated by the severity of accidents occurring in the 
operations. There were indications that the safety index could provide 
an estimate of the degree of hazard associated with specific industrial 
operations. Data from more operations in this industrial field is 
required to increase the reliability of the correlation and to determine 
if the assumption of a linear correlation was valid. 
This procedure indicated that an effective tool has been developed 
to determine the degree of hazard and the characteristics of that hazard 
for the Air Force Logistics Command. More data is required to verify 
the results obtained in this thesis. It is recommended that this pro­
cedure be tested further s using data from other industrial fields«, to 
indicate the effectiveness of the index as an adequate tool for use 
generally in industrial safety applications. 
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APPENDIX A 
CHECKLIST FOR USE IN DEVELOPING 
THE SAFETY INDEX FOR AIR FORCE 
LOGISTICS COMMAND OPERATIONS 
Use of Checklist 
The checklist, listed in this section, will be used for the 
evaluation of all Air Force Logistics Command operations. This evalua­
tion will involve the rating of each individual operation as to the 
presence of each of the categories of causal factors as compared with 
the normal AFLC operation. The qualified safety person, rating the 
operation, should consider each category and establish a percentage 
rating of the category's effect on the accident experience as compared 
with the effect of the same category on a typical operation. The 
rating developed for each category should be multiplied by the indus­
trial hazard index for the particular category to arrive at the spe­
cific hazard index. The specific hazard indices will be summed and 
the result will be the safety index for the specific operation. 
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SAFETY INDEX CHECKLIST 
Causal Category Code Hazard Index Rating (%) Spec. Hazard Index 
Unsafe Conditions 
01 .0042 

















36 _ _ _ _ _ 
37 .0360 

















25 _ _ _ = _ 
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SAFETY INDEX CHECKLIST (continued) 
Causal Category Code Hazard Index Rating (%) Spec. Hazard Index 








































93 . 0040 
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SAFETY INDEX CHECKLIST (continued) 
Causal Category Code Hazard Index Rating (%) Spec. Hazard Index 








CHECKLISTS FOR RATED ORGANIZATIONS 
The following pages contain the checklists which were completed 
on the four operations at Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. The hazard 
index applying to each causal category may be obtained from Tables 2 
and 4. 
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01 1.0 .0042 20 1.0 .0070 
20 1.3 .1474 2.2 1.2 .1811 
22 1.5 .1515 23 1.3 .0065 
25 1.3 .7348 24 1.0 .0789 
26 .7 .7568 27 1.0 .0112 
29 1.3 .7904 31 .5 .4337 
30 .8 .0311 32 1.2 .0060 
31 1.0 .0040 33 1.0 .0546 
33 1.5 .0765 34 1.5 .4059 
35 1.0 .2343 36 1.3 .1755 
37 1.0 .0360 37 .3 .0791 
38 .8 .0240 39 1.0 .0559 
42 1.0 .0292 46 1.0 .0968 
97 1.0 .3349 47 1.5 .5462 
98 1.0 .3003 49 1.5 .4440 
99 1.0 4.0807 52 1.2 .1159 
7.7361 53 1.0 .0030 
61 .7 .0222 
63 .5 .0230 
70 .5 .0102 
71 .2 .0359 
72 .8 .1364 
84 .7 .1149 
85 1.0 .8355 
88 .5 .5814 
90 1.0 . 0374 
99 1.0 .6317 
5.1299 
SAFETY INDEX = 7.7361 + 5.1299 = 12.8660 
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SAFETY INDEX CHECKLIST 
(Sheet Metal) 
Cause Specific 
Code Rating Hazard Index 
Unsafe 
Cond. 
25 .3 .1696 
27 .4 .0936 
29 1.0 .6080 
30 1.3 .0506 
33 .8 .0408 
34 1.5 .1763 
35 1.5 .3515 
37 1.0 .3060 
38 .4 .0120 
42 1.3 .0300 
97 1.0 .3349 
98 1.0 .3003 
99 1.0 4.0807 
6.2843 
Cause Specific 
Code Rating Hazard Index 
Unsafe 
Act 
31 1.8 1.5613 
33 1.0 .0546 
34 1.0 .2706 
37 1.0 .2635 
38 .8 .6504 
39 1.5 .0839 
42 .5 .1096 
46 o3 .0290 
47 1.3 .4733 
49 1.5 .4440 
52 1.2 .1159 
56 1.3 .0468 
57 .8 .2118 
58 1.3 .2350 
60 .8 .0512 
61 1.5 .0476 
63 1.5 .1307 
67 .3 .0270 
70 .8 .0162 
71 .8 .1434 
72 .2 .0341 
84 1.3 .2135 
85 1.5 1.2533 
87 1.3 .1538 
88 1.5 1.7442 
91 1.5 .7350 
94 .5 .0904 
98 1.0 .0070 
99 1.0 .6317 
9.8472 
SAFETY INDEX = 6.2843 + 9.8472 = 16.1315 
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SAFETY INDEX CHECKLIST 
(Hydraulic Shop) 
Cause Specific 
Code Rating Hazard Index 
Unsafe 
Cond. 
25 1.3 .7348 
27 .5 .0954 
28 .2 .0017 
29 1.3 .7904 
33 .5 .0255 
34 1.3 .1528 
35 1.5 .3515 
37 1.0 .0360 
38 1.0 .0300 
39 .8 .0168 
40 2.5 .2250 
41 1.3 .0546 
42 1.3 .0380 
97 1.0 .3349 
98 1.0 .3003 
99 1.0 4.0807 
7.2684 
Cause Specific 
Code Rating Hazard Index 
Unsafe 
Act 
31 1.5 1.3011 
34 .8 .2165 
37 1.3 .3462 
38 1.3 1.0569 
39 .8 .0447 
42 1.0 .2191 
46 1.0 .0968 
47 1.0 .3641 
49 1.0 .2960 
51 1.0 .0190 
52 1.0 .0966 
56 1.0 .0360 
57 .8 .2118 
58 1.0 .1808 
60 1.0 .0640 
61 1.3 .0412 
63 1.3 .0597 
66 1.0 .0871 
67 .5 .0450 
71 1.3 .2331 
72 .8 .1364 
73 .5 .0123 
74 .8 .0128 
84 1.3 .2135 
85 1.3 1.0862 
87 1.5 .1775 
88 .8 .9302 
91 .7 .3430 
98 1.0 .0070 
99 1.0 .6317 
7.5627 
SAFETY INDEX = 7.2684 + 7.5627 + 14.8311 
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SAFETY INDEX CHECKLIST 
(Assessory & Blade Repair) 
Cause Specific 
Code Rating Hazard Index 
Unsafe 
Cond. 
20 .5 .0567 
25 1.3 .7348 
27 .3 .0572 
28 .4 .0034 
29 .8 .4864 
30 1.8 .0700 
31 1.0 .0040 
33 1.0 .0510 
34 1.5 .1763 
35 1.0 .2343 
37 1.0 .0360 
38 .8 .0240 
41 .8 .0336 
42 1.0 .02.92 
55 1.5 .4205 
97 1.0 .3349 
98 1.5 .4505 
99 1.0 4.0807 
7.2835 
Cause Specific 
Code Rating Hazard Index 
Unsafe 
Act 
21 1.5 1.3011 
33 .8 .0437 
34 1.5 .4059 
37 1.3 .3426 
39 1.3 .0727 
42 1.3 .2848 
46 1.0 .0968 
38 1.0 .8310 
47 1.3 .4735 
49 1.5 .4440 
51 1.3 .0247 
52 1.8 .1739 
56 1.0 .0360 
57 1.3 .3442 
58 1.3 .2350 
60 1.3 .0832 
61 1.3 .0412 
63 .4 .0184 
66 .3 .0261 
70 .8 .0162 
71 1.3 .2331 
84 1.0 .1642 
85 1.0 .8355 
87 1.3 .1538 
88 1.3 1.5116 
91 .5 .2450 
94 .5 .0904 
98 1.0 .0070 
99 1.0 .6317 
9.1491 
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